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Abstract 
The prolonged systemic crisis in international financial markets commencing in 2007 was also a 
crisis in corporate governance and regulation. The apparent ascendancy of Anglo-American 
markets and governance institutions was profoundly questioned by the scale and contagion of the  
global financial crisis. Instead of risk being hedged, it had become inter-connected and 
international, and unknown. The market capitalisation of the stock markets of the world had 
peaked at $62 trillion at the end of 2007, but were by October 2008 in free fall, having lost $33 
trillion dollars, over half of their value in12 months of unrelenting financial and corporate 
failures. A debate has continued for some time about the costs and benefits of the financialisation 
of advanced industrial economies. The long progression of financial crises around the world 
served as a reminder that the system is neither self-regulating or robust. The explanation of why 
investment banks and other financial institutions took such spectacular risks with extremely 
leveraged positions on many securities and derivatives, and the risk management, governance and 
ethical environment that allowed such conduct to take place is demands detailed analysis. 
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The prolonged systemic crisis in international financial markets commencing in 2007/ 2008 was 
also a crisis in corporate governance and regulation. The most severe financial disaster since the 
Great Depression of the 1930s exposed the dangers of unregulated financial markets and nominal 
corporate governance. The crisis originated in Wall Street where de-regulation unleashed highly 
incentivised investment banks to flood world markets with toxic financial products. As a stunning 
series of banks and investment companies collapsed in the United States and then in Europe, a 
frightening dimension of the global economy became fully apparent: a new world disorder of 
violently volatile markets and deep financial insecurity. Advocating systemic change President 
Nicolas Sarkozy of France proclaimed, “The world came within a whisker of catastrophe. We 
can’t run the risk of it happening again. Self-regulation as a way of solving all problems is 
finished. Laissez-faire is finished. The all-powerful market that always knows best is finished” 
(Washington Post 28 September 2008), as if presidential rhetoric alone could sweep away an 
enveloping, financially driven political economy. For decades Europe has actively sought deeper 
financial integration with the United States, reducing barriers to trade, and liberalizing markets, 
leading onwards towards globalisation. Transatlantic integration is forging economic relations 
involving financial markets, services, manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications and 
other industry sectors (CTR/CEPS 2005). However, for this effort at integrating markets and 
businesses to succeed, a supporting integration of institutions, regulation and corporate 
governance is required. European legal institutions, regulatory, governance and accounting 
practices face insistent pressures to adapt to the reality of international competitive markets. The 
European relationship-based corporate governance systems in particular are often criticised as 
being inherently less efficient than the Anglo-American market based systems.  
 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE 2008 WALL STREET FINANCIAL CRISIS 
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  “America’s financial institutions have not managed risk; 
  they have created it” (Joseph Stiglitz 2008a). 
 
Figure 1    Collapsing Stock Exchanges in 2008 Global Financial Crisis  
  (Year to 2 December 2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Stock Exchanges 
 
The apparent ascendancy of Anglo-American markets and governance institutions was 
profoundly questioned by the scale and contagion of the 2008 global financial crisis. The crisis 
was initiated by falling house prices and rising mortgage default rates in the highly inflated US 
housing market. A severe credit crisis developed through 2007 into 2008 as financial institutions 
became fearful of the potential scale of the sub-prime mortgages concealed in the securities they 
had bought. As a result banks refused to lend to each other because of increased counter-party 
risk that other banks might default. A solvency crisis ensued as banks were slow to admit to the 
great holes in their accounts the sub-prime mortgages had caused (partly because they were 
themselves unaware of the seriousness of the problem), and the difficulty in raising capital to 
restore their balance sheets. As an increasing number of financial institutions collapsed in the US, 
UK, and Europe, successive government efforts to rescue individual institutions, and to offer 
general support for the financial system, did not succeed in restoring confidence as markets 
continued in free-fall, with stock exchanges across the world losing half their value (Figure 1).   
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Financial insecurity rapidly became contagious internationally as fears of a global economic 
recession became widespread and stock markets around the world crashed. This financial crisis 
was larger in scale than any crisis since the 1930s Great Depression, involving losses 
conservatively estimated in October 2008 by the IMF (2008) as potentially $1,400 billion dollars, 
eclipsing earlier crises in Asia, Japan and the US (Figure 2). Martin Wolf was quick to realise the 
implications of the crisis, as he put it in the Financial Times (5 September 2007) “We are living 
through the first crisis of the brave new world of securitised financial markets. It is too early to 
tell how economically important the upheaval will prove. But nobody can doubt its significance 
for the financial system. Its origins lie with credit expansion and financial innovations in the US 
itself. It cannot be blamed on ‘crony capitalism’ in peripheral economies, but rather on 
responsibility in the core of the world economy.” 
Figure  2 Comparison of International Financial Crises 
 
Source: IMF (2008a:9) 
 
Origins of the Crisis 
In the cyclical way markets work, the origins of the 2008 financial crisis may be found in the 
solutions to the previous market crisis. The US Federal Reserve under the sage Alan Greenspan 
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responded to the collapse of confidence caused by the dot-com disaster and Enron failures in 
2001/2002 by reducing US interest rates to one per cent, their lowest in 45 years, flooding the 
market with cheap credit to jump-start the economy back into life. US business did recover faster 
than expected, but the cheap credit had washed into the financial services and housing sectors 
producing the largest speculative bubbles ever witnessed in the American economy (Fleckenstein 
2008). The scene was set by the 1999 dismantling of the 1932 Glass-Steagall Act which had 
separated commercial banking from investment banking and insurance services, opening the way 
for a consolidation of the vastly expanding and increasingly competitive US financial services 
industry. Phillips (2008:5) describes this as a “burgeoning debt and credit complex”: “Vendors of 
credit cards, issuers of mortgages and bonds, architects of asset-backed securities and structured 
investment vehicles – occupied the leading edge. The behemoth financial conglomerates, 
Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase et al, were liberated in 1999 for the first time since the 1930s to 
marshal banking, insurance, securities, and real estate under a single, vaulting institutional roof.” 
In this newly emboldened finance sector the name of the game was leverage – the capacity to 
access vast amounts of credit cheaply to takeover businesses and to do deals. Wall Street 
investment banks and hedge funds flourished with their new found access to cheap credit. Exotic 
financial instruments were devised and marketed internationally: futures, options and swaps 
evolved into collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), credit default swaps (CDSs), and many other 
acronyms, all of which packaged vast amounts of debt to be traded on the securities markets. 
Abandoning their traditional financial conservatism banks looked beyond taking deposits and 
lending to the new businesses of wealth management, and eagerly adopted new instruments and 
business models. As the IMF put it  “Banking systems in the major countries have gone through a 
process of disintermediation—that is, a greater share of financial intermediation is now taking 
place through tradable securities (rather than bank loans and deposits)…Banks have increasingly 
moved financial risks (especially credit risks) off their balance sheets and into securities 
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markets—for example, by pooling and converting assets into tradable securities and entering into 
interest rate swaps and other derivatives transactions—in response both to regulatory incentives 
such as capital requirements and to internal incentives to improve risk-adjusted returns on capital 
for shareholders and to be more competitive… Securitization makes the pricing and allocation of 
capital more efficient because changes in financial risks are reflected much more quickly in asset 
prices and flows than on bank balance sheets. The downside is that markets have become more 
volatile, and this volatility could pose a threat to financial stability” (2002:3). 
Global Derivatives Markets 
As the new financial instruments were developed and marketed, the securities markets grew 
massively in the 2000s dwarfing the growth of the real economy. For example,  
according to the Bank of International Settlements the global derivatives markets grew at the rate 
of 32% per annum from 1990, and the notional amount of derivatives reached 106 trillion dollars 
by 2002, 477 trillion dollars by 2006, and exceeded 531 trillion dollars by 2008 (though gross 
market value is a small fraction of this) (McKinsey 2008:20).  The supposed purpose of this 
increasingly massive exercise was to hedge risk and add liquidity to the financial system. 
Derivatives allow financial institutions and corporations to take greater and more complex risks 
such as issuing more mortgages and corporate debt, because they may protect debt holders 
against losses. Since derivatives contracts are widely traded, risk may be further limited, though 
this increases the number of parties exposed if defaults occur. “Complex derivatives were at the 
heart of the credit market turmoil that rippled through financial markets in 2007, raising concerns 
about the financial players’ abilities to manage risk as capital markets rapidly evolve. Unlike 
equities, debt securities and bank deposits, which represent financial claims against future 
earnings by households and companies, derivatives are risk-shifting agreements among financial 
market participants” (McKinsey 2008:20). Because of this fundamental difference and 
indeterminacy McKinsey did not include derivatives in their calculation of the value of global 
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financial assets, an indication of the ephemeral quality of derivatives. Yet derivatives certainly 
have their defenders who claim they make an essential contribution to international liquidity. A 
riveting analysis of the legacy of the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve in the New York 
Times, detailed how Alan Greenspan defended derivatives markets as an innovation helping to 
develop and stabilise the international financial system, “Not only have individual financial 
institutions become less vulnerable to shocks from underlying risk factors, but also the financial 
system as a whole has become more resilient.”  Others were less sanguine, and both George 
Soros and Warren Buffett avoided investing in derivatives contracts because of their 
impenetrable complexity. Buffet described derivatives in 2003 as “financial weapons of mass 
destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal,” and pointed out that 
collateralised debt obligation contracts could stretch to 750,000 pages of impenetrable (and 
presumably unread) text (New York Times 8 October 2008).  
Greenspan was sceptical about successive legislative efforts to regulate derivatives in the 1990s. 
Charles A. Bowsher, head of the General Accounting Office, commenting on a report to 
Congress  identifying significant weaknesses in the regulatory oversight of derivatives, said in 
testimony to the House Sub-Committee on Telecommunications and Finance in 1994 : “The 
sudden failure or abrupt withdrawal from trading of any of these large U.S. dealers could cause 
liquidity problems in the markets and could also pose risks to others, including federally insured 
banks and the financial system as a whole. In some cases intervention has and could result in a 
financial bailout paid for or guaranteed by taxpayers.” In his testimony at the time, Greenspan 
was reassuring. “Risks in financial markets, including derivatives markets, are being regulated by 
private parties. There is nothing involved in federal regulation per se which makes it superior to 
market regulation,”  though he did accept derivatives could amplify crises because they connect 
together financial institutions:  “The very efficiency that is involved here means that if a crisis 
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were to occur, that that crisis is transmitted at a far faster pace and with some greater virulence.” 
When the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the federal agency which regulates options 
and futures trading examined derivatives regulation in 1997, the head of the Commission, 
Brooksley E. Born said in testimony to Congress that such opaque trading might “threaten our 
regulated markets or, indeed our economy without any federal agency knowing about it,” but she 
was chastised for taking steps that would lead to a financial crisis by Treasury officials (New 
York Times 8 October 2008). The explosive potential of derivatives was always present, as the 
implosion of the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 revealed. With 
equity of $4.72 billion and debt of $124 billion LTCM had managed to secure off-balance sheet 
derivative positions of $1.29 trillion (mostly in interest rate swaps). The rescue of LTCM by a 
consortium of banks led by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in order to maintain the 
integrity of the financial system, was a harbinger of how a decade later on massive systemic 
financial risk taking would be rescued by governments after the event, rather than regulated by 
governments before the event.  
Figure 3 The Growth of Subprime Mortgages in the United States 
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The Subprime Mortgage Debacle 
The subprime mortgage phenomenon demonstrated how unconscionable risks could be taken on 
by investment banks, concealed in securities, and sold on to other financial institutions that had 
little idea of the risk they were assuming. Encouraged by a political climate in the United States 
that favoured extending home ownership, by the rapid inflation in the US housing market, and by 
the ready availability of cheap credit, mortgage companies across the United Stages began 
extending house loans to people with little prospect of ever repaying them. While asset prices 
continued to rise this problem was concealed for individuals who could borrow more money 
using their increased house equity as collateral. Banks did not feel exposed due to the apparently 
endless increase in asset values backing their loans. From 2001 subprime mortgages increased 
from a small segment of the market, to hundreds of billions of dollars of mortgages by 2006 
(Figure 3).These mortgage contracts were sold on to larger financial institutions, who bundled 
them into securities in a manner that ultimately proved fatal for a significant part of the 
international financial system as Le Roy (2008) explains: “Securitisation becomes increasingly 
complicated when financial institutions chose to retain Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS), and 
re-securitise pools of MBS bonds into Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs).  Securitisation 
becomes more complicated again when institutions create Special Investment Vehicles (SIVs), 
off balance sheet entities which hold pools of MBSs and CDOs and issue short and medium term 
debt (rather than longer term debt like most CDOs) referred to as Asset Backed Commercial 
Paper (ABCP) (Rosen 2007; Schwarcz 2008).  It is easy to see why securitisation is seen as a 
“shadow banking system”, whereby off balance sheet entities and over the counter (OTC) credit 
instruments lie outside the reach of regulators and capital adequacy guidelines, making risk 
increasingly difficult to price, manage and quantify (Whalen 2008; Schwarcz 2008). The 
increasing complexity of securitisation and the change in lending practices to “originate to 
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distribute” led to acute moral hazard, where each participant in the mortgage chain was trying to 
make continuously greater returns whilst assuming that they passed on all the associated risks to 
other participants (Lewis 2007; Ee & Xiong 2008).   Financial innovation was meant to distribute 
risks evenly throughout the financial system, thus reducing the risk for the system as a whole, 
however increased risk tolerance, moral hazard and an insatiable thirst for return pushed all 
participants to borrow larger sums and to take increasingly bigger bets.  The result was that 
whilst risk was dispersed for the individual players, it was amplified for the entire financial 
system (Lim 2008)”.   
 
The financial system was exposed as the US housing bubble burst as house mortgage holders 
exhausted the teaser low rates that had enticed them into borrowing, and were confronted by 
much higher rates of repayment they could not afford. With non-recursive loans in the US, 
mortgagees could simply walk away from their debt, posting the keys back to the bank (‘jingle 
mail’) leaving properties in many inner urban areas to become derelict, as advancing foreclosures 
emptied whole neighbourhoods in some cities. This surge in mortgage defaults and foreclosures 
was followed by a plunge in the prices of mortgage-backed securities. The sub-prime crisis 
unfolded as it became apparent that sub-prime mortgages had been mixed with other assets in  
CDOs, somehow given double A ratings by the ratings agencies, and marketed world-wide. 
Innovative securities originally conceived to insulate against risk, had through misuse 
metastasized into the wide distribution of acutely dangerous and uncontrollable risks. Adrian 
Cadbury observed on this: “I suggest that there are two aspects of what went wrong. One was that 
in general risk was undervalued by the financial institutions. The second was that the banks 
simply did not know where their risks lay. Sub-prime mortgages were parcelled out by banks and 
sold through perhaps three or four levels of intermediary. When house prices fell people handed 
in their keys. The intermediaries found they were in the property business which they could not 
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finance and in turn each level went bust. The banks found that they were ultimately responsible, a 
contingent liability they were unaware of and had not provided for. I think a sound rule is that if 
you do not understand the business you are getting into, don’t!” The opaqueness and complexity 
of the financial instruments which served as a means to conceal the toxicity of the trillions of 
dollars of securities developed and sold by the investment banks returned to haunt them with the 
realization that no international financial institution fully understood how much of these sub-
prime assets were buried in their portfolios, and the growing possibility of counter-party failure, 
the credit markets seized up, and banks and other financial institutions began falling over as they 
announced huge write downs, not only in the US, but the UK, and throughout Europe (Table 1). 
Instead of risk being hedged, it had become inter-connected and international, and unknown.    
Table 1   Subprime Losses by International Banks October 2008 
US FINANCIAL INSTITUTION FAILURES 
As financial institutions, over-burdened with debt, desperately attempted to deleverage  
by selling assets, including the mortgage backed securities, the cruel ‘paradox of deleveraging’ 
was exposed: that the fire-sale of assets simply drives asset prices down, and left the banks in an 
even worse position. (Paul Volker, the former President of the US Federal Reserve, who 
President Obama welcomed back as an economic adviser, once referred to “the transient 
pleasures of extreme leverage…” ) Caught in these financial manoeuvres, one of the largest Wall 
Street investment banks Bear Stearns failed in March 2008, and in a deal sponsored by the US 
Federal Reserve was sold to JPMorgan Chase. With the collapse of a string of venerable Wall 
Street institutions the US Treasury, Federal Reserve, and SEC were galvanized into action, and 
selectively nationalized those companies thought too vital to the US financial structure to allow 
to fail, arranged the sale of companies that could be salvaged, or allowed companies to collapse 
that were thought dispensable (Appendix 1).  
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In September 2008 in quick succession the two giant US mortgage corporations Fannie May 
(FNMA) and Freddie Mac (FHLMC)  could not raise capital, and with $5 trillion in mortgage 
backed securities, the US government was forced to intervene assuming a ‘conservatorship’ of 
the agencies, investing $200 billion in preferred stock and credit. (This reversed policy 
establishing these government sponsored enterprises as private corporations in 1968 and 1970 
respectively). Within days AIG, one of the world’s largest insurance companies, which was 
responsible for insuring many of the securities contracts of other financial institutions, was 
rescued by the Federal Reserve which offered a credit facility of $85 billion for a 79.9% equity 
stake (the largest government bail-out of a private company in US history, and bizarrely making 
the US government the major sponsor of Manchester United football club, who wore ‘AIG’ 
emblazoned on their shirts). The investment bank Lehman Brothers was the only major 
institution allowed to become bankrupt, with Barclay’s buying the investment arm after 
negotiations for Barclay’s to acquire the whole firm stalled. The consequences of this fateful 
decision by Henry Poulson the US Treasurer (and formerly CEO of Goldman Sachs) not to 
rescue Lehman’s reverberated painfully through the international financial system: as Lehman’s 
derivative positions were unwound, inter-bank lending froze up, and confidence in the viability of 
financial institutions around the world suddenly collapsed. Merrill Lynch which had racked up 
$51 billion dollars in losses on asset backed securities was the third of the top five Wall Street 
investment banks to fail, and was sold to Bank of America for $50 billion. Washington Mutual 
the sixth largest bank in the US was declared bankrupt, and JP Morgan Chase bought the banking 
assets from the government. Wachovia the fourth largest bank holding company was the subject 
of a US$15 billion takeover from Wells Fargo contested by Citigroup.  
 
Though this was the greatest series of government interventions in US financial markets in recent 
decades, the NYSE continued in free-fall, and the whole of the US banking sector appeared 
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vulnerable. When selective assistance did not resolve the problem an enormous rescue operation 
offering up to $700 billion to buy up toxic securities from the financial institutions in order to 
restore credit markets was brought by the Bush administration to a Congress reluctant about 
rescuing Wall Street from its own folly. The Emergency Economic Stabilisation Act 2008 
authorised the US Treasurer Henry Paulson to spend up to $700 billion purchasing distressed 
assets, particularly mortgage-backed securities from the banks. The purposed of the act was to 
purchase the toxic assets, assuring the worth of the bank’s remaining assets, and restoring the 
confidence of the market. Reflecting the widespread public opposition to the bail-out, the House 
of Representatives rejected the proposal, and the Dow Jones dropped 777 points a $1.2 trillion 
dollars fall in market value. Criticism of the original Poulson proposals included objection to the 
idea that taxpayers should bail out Wall Street; the ambiguity of objectives and lack of oversight 
of the new agency responsible for buying assets; the prospect of over-paying for bad assets 
giving the executives and investors in financial firms a windfall at taxpayers expense;  and a 
conviction that any purchase should be of preferred stock in the banks, avoiding the problem of 
valuing complex assets, and offering a greater degree of control and the possibility of a more 
significant return from the exercise (Stiglitz 2008a; Krugman 2008). Finally a heavily amended 
proposal was eventually passed through Congress on 3 October 2008 giving the Treasurer 
immediate access to $250 billion, following that a further $100 billion could be authorised by the 
President, with Congress confirming the last $350 billion. Transparency details were required for 
each transaction, and a set of oversight mechanisms involving a Financial Oversight Board, 
Congressional Oversight Panel, and Special Inspector General of the program. The Treasurer was 
required to obtain the right to purchase non-voting stock in companies that participated in the sale 
of assets giving the government an equity interest in the companies. The Treasury was required to 
maximise assistance to homeowners facing foreclosure. Finally companies participating in the 
scheme were prohibited from offering executives incentives to take excessive risks, or to offer 
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golden parachutes to executives, and were given the right to clawback senior executive bonuses if 
they were later found to be based on inaccurate data. When stock markets opened the following 
Monday after the Act was passed, the Dow Jones was down 700 points, the FTSE down 7.9%, 
the Dax down 7.1%, and France’s CAC 40 down 9%, revealing that markets were not going to be 
easily reassured, and the financial crisis was becoming internationally contagious.  
 
EUROPEAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FAILURES 
Figure 4  Market Capitalization and Equity Book Values of Financial Institutions  
  2006-2008  (Billions of US dollars) 
 
 
 
 
Source IMF (2008a:22) 
 
All over Europe as the contagion spread the impact of the subprime crisis was wreaking havoc in 
financial institutions, threatening entire financial systems, and severely undermining the fragile 
unity of the European Union (Appendix 1). The scale of the crisis for European financial 
institutions, relative to the size of the sector, was becoming just as serious as for US financial 
institutions (Figure 4). The first tremors of the crisis were felt in the UK, which rivals the US as 
the centre of the international financial system. Among the early casualties of the subprime crisis 
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were Northern Rock, one of the largest mortgage lenders in the UK, which depended on the 
wholesale market for short term credit. Northern Rock could not raise sufficient capital in 
September 2007, and after a run on the bank reminiscent of the 1920s, was effectively 
nationalised by the UK government trying desperately to contain an impending mass public 
financial panic.  As the credit crisis worsened for institutions used to relying on the wholesale 
market and inter-bank lending, a liquidity crisis gripped the major British banks, while their share 
prices collapsed.  In September 2008 HBOS, the UK’s largest mortgage lender was sold to 
Lloyds TSB as the government suspended the regulations limiting maximum market share of any 
one bank. Bradford and Bingley, another large mortgage provider was nationalised by the 
government, with the sale of its savings arm to Abbey owned by the Spanish Santander. As panic 
selling continued on the London Stock Exchange with HBOS and Bank of Scotland bank shares 
losing 40% of their value in a single day’s trading, the UK government intervened with a £500 
billion (US$850) billion rescue package for eight of the largest UK banks intended to restore 
stability to the system. This package consisted of up to £50 billion in capital investment for the 
banks in exchange for preference shares, short-term loans up to £200 billion from the Bank of 
England, and loan guarantees for banks lending to each other of up to £250 billion. The offer of 
assistance was conditional on restraint in executive incentives and rewards and on dividend 
payments, and that banks must be able to lend to small businesses and home owners.  
 
In other European countries the response to the crisis was largely managed on a national basis as 
financial institutions failed. Fortis one of the world’s largest banking, insurance and investment 
companies was rescued by the Netherlands nationalising its Dutch operations, and France’s BNP 
Paribas buying its Belgian and Luxemburg operations. Dexia the Belgian financial services 
company was rescued by the French, Belgian, and Luxemburg governments. As the entire 
banking system of Iceland began to fail, the government invested €600 million for a 75% stake in 
   
 16 
Glitnir, the second largest bank. Finally in Germany the second largest property lender Hypo 
Real Estate received a €50 billion rescue coordinated by the government, including €20 billion 
from the Bundesbank. However the efforts of Nicolas Sarkozy as EU president to secure a 
coordinated response to the crisis in establishing a European fund to rescue failing banks did not 
meet with early success: unlike the national central banks, the European Central Bank was not a 
lender of last resort, simply acting as the Eurozone’s monetary authority. Subsequently the 
announcement by Ireland and Greece, apparently followed by Germany,  to guarantee all 
depositors savings, led other countries including Sweden and Denmark to do the same - seeming 
to cast aside any sense of European unity in the effort to save national banking systems. Spain 
established its own bail-out package, and Germany and other European countries establishing 
similar provisions. 
Figure 5         World Exchange Market Capitalization (US $trillion) 
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The market capitalisation of the stock markets of the world had peaked at $62 trillion at the end 
of  2007, but were by October 2008 in free fall, having lost $33 trillion dollars, over half of their 
value in12 months of unrelenting financial and corporate failures (Figure 5). However in an 
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unprecedented effort to provide a coordinated response, the central banks of the major industrial 
powers simultaneously lowered interest rates, as it became clear that a systemic response was 
required to a systemic crisis. As the finance ministers of the G7 countries met in emergency 
session in Washington, Dominique Strauss-Kahn the head of the IMF insisted, "Intensifying 
solvency concerns about a number of the largest US-based and European financial institutions 
have pushed the global financial system to the brink of systemic meltdown." The G7 ministers 
announced a plan to free up the flow of credit, back efforts by banks to raise money and revive 
the mortgage market. The 15 Eurozone leaders agreed to meet again in Paris to attempt a 
common approach, with Angela Merkel the German Chancellor declaring “We must redirect the 
markets so that they serve the people, and not ruin them” (BBC, 12 October 2008). At the 
meeting of 15 Eurozone countries convened by President Sarkozy the UK Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown was invited (the UK not being a member of the Eurozone) to explain the measures the UK 
government had adopted. There was agreement to implement a coordinated framework of action 
to take preference shares in banks and underwrite interbank lending. A few days later a meeting 
of all EU leaders confirmed support for this approach. Brown argued for a two stage process: 
““Stage one was to stabilise the financial system with liquidity, recapitalisation and trying to get 
funds moving for small businesses and consumers,” he said. “Stage two is to make sure that the 
problems of the financial system, which started in America, do not recur.” The target was to “root 
out irresponsibilities and excesses” in the system. “We need supervision and regulation where it 
has been lacking and where it is necessary, and international co-operation. We need an early 
warning system and proper co-ordination” (The Times 16 October 2008). The rescue package 
unveiled at this meeting committed the EU countries potentially to intervening with $1.8 trillion 
dollars, more than double the rescue package agreed by the US Congress.  
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The UK rescue package won wide acceptance among the financial community, and 
internationally, which led US officials to emphasise that their rescue package also allowed for the 
government to buy preference shares in the banks they assisted. This was a clause the Democrats 
in Congress had insisted on inserting into the emergency act, contrary to Poulson’s original 
intention to simply purchase the toxic debt of the banks. At a crucial moment in the international 
financial crisis it was apparent that the US government was adjusting its own policy and 
following Europe’s lead: “With his new initiative, Paulson appears to be conducting an about-
face with regard to his government's previous policies and to be adopting an approach similar to 
that being used in Europe. Paulson's original plan envisioned primarily purchasing bad mortgages 
and other rotten debt in order to restore trust in the financial system. The Bush administration 
hadn't even considered the idea of government investments -- Congress first addressed the issue 
in its revisions of the bailout package. According to the Wall Street Journal, the new plan largely 
replaces the former ideas, which failed to restore confidence, leading to dramatic decline of stock 
markets last week” (Spiegel Online 14 October 2008). The US government announced a $250 
billion plan to purchase stakes in a wide variety of banks in an effort to return them to solvency, 
with major investments of $25 billion each in Bank of America, Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase, 
Wells Fargo, and $10 billion investments in Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley.  
Europe and the US had come to adopt similar strategies to address the enveloping crisis, yet with 
different philosophies regarding the outcome. President Bush declared, “This is an essential 
short-term measure to ensure the viability of America’s banking system. This is not intended to 
take over the free market, but to preserve it.” The Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson said the lack 
of confidence in the financial system was a threat to the US economy, and argued that the 
government taking equity stakes was “objectionable to most Americans, including myself. We 
regret taking these actions, but we must to restore confidence in the financial system” (BBC 14 
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October 2008). In contrast the President of the European Union Nicolas Sarkozy insisted "Cette 
crise est la crise de trop. Il faut refonder le système.... fonder un nouveau capitalisme sur des 
valeurs qui mettent la finance au service des entreprises et des citoyens et non l’inverse". ("This 
crisis is one too much; the system has to be re-established…a new capitalism based on values that 
place finance in the service of businesses and citizens, and not the reverse") (France Info 27 
October 2008). 
Figure 6 Scale of Financial Assets in Multiples of Gross Domestic Product 
 
 
 
Source: IMF (2008a:68) 
 
THE FINANCIALISATION OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
Directing markets was now a great deal more difficult since financial markets have become much 
larger, inter-connected and internationalised. A McKinsey survey illustrates how European 
capital markets are catching up with US markets (including equity securities, private debt 
securities, government debt securities, and bank deposits). “The United States remains the 
world’s largest and most liquid capital market, with $56 trillion in assets, or nearly one-third of 
the global total. But Europe’s financial markets are approaching the scale of the US markets. 
Including the United Kingdom, Europe’s financial markets reached $53 trillion in 2006 – still 
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less than the US total, but growing faster. Three quarters of the gain came from the deepening of 
Europe’s equity and private debt markets. The eurozone’s financial markets reached $37.6 
trillion, the UK markets reached $10 trillion, and other Western European nations $5.6 trillion. 
Equally important, the euro is emerging as a rival to the dollar as the world’s global reserve 
currency, reflecting in part the growing vibrancy and depth of Europe’s financial markets. In 
mid-2007, the value of euro currency in circulation surpassed that of dollar notes in the world for 
the first time, and the euro has been the top choice in the issuance of bonds” (McKinsey 2008:11-
12). Relative to gross domestic product the financial sector in all of the industrial countries grew 
considerably in the last two decades of financial de-regulation, innovation and globalisation. The 
size of financial assets in both the US and UK had more than doubled in 20 years. The massive 
growth of the UK finance sector and also the sustained growth of the European finance sectors 
involved the adoption of similar financial innovation and exotic instruments as in the United 
States. British and European financial institutions had also succumbed to the temptations of high 
leverage (in some cases higher than the Wall Street investment banks), minimal risk 
management, and a fascination with the returns that new financial securities and speculative 
industries -  most notably the property sector -  might deliver. In the UK the financial sector 
became gargantuan, with assets around 9 times GDP (Figure 6), a multiple more than double that 
of the U.S. finance sector. A concentration on financial services was considered in the US and 
UK as an essential part of the new economy, and was associated with rapid market growth, high 
profits and very high salaries for a privileged few dealing in the most exotic financial securities. 
London basked in its developing reputation as the financial capital of the world, and when annual 
bonuses were paid in the finance sector, property prices in central London (already now among 
the highest in the world) jumped again (City of London 2008).  
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Fuelling the whole process of financialisation were volcanic eruptions of debt. When Alan 
Greenspan became Chairman of the Federal Reserve in 1987 public and private debt in the US 
totalled $10.5 trillion, but after his departure in 2006 it had quadruped to $43 trillion. “Debt in 
record quantities had been piled on top of the trillions still extant from previous binges of the 
eighties and nineties, so that by 2007 the nations overseers watched a US economy in which 
public and private indebtedness was three times bigger than that year’s gross national product. 
This ratio topped the prior record, set during the years after the stock market crash of 1929. 
However, in contrast to the 1920s and 1930s when manufacturing retained its overwhelming 
primacy despite the economy’s temporary froth of stockmarket and ballyhoo, the eighties and 
nineties brought a much deeper transformation. Goods production lost the two-to-one edge in 
GDP it had enjoyed in the seventies. In 2005, on the cusp of Greenspan’s retirement, financial 
services -  the new ubercategory spanning finance, insurance and real estate – far exceeded other 
sectors taking over one-fifth of GDP against manufacturing’s gaunt, shrunken 12 per cent. 
During the two previous decades (and only marginally stalled by the early 1990s economic 
bailouts) the baton of economic leadership had been passed” (Phillips 2008:5).  
 
A debate has continued for some time about the costs and benefits of the financialisation of 
advanced industrial economies (Epstein 2005; Erturk et al 2008; Froud and Johal 2008; Froud et 
al 2006; Langley 2008; Martin 2002). Competing definitions of ‘financialisation’ include: 
 the ascendancy of ‘shareholder value’ as a mode of corporate governance (Aglietta and 
Reberioux 2005);  
 the growing dominance of capital market financial systems over bank-based financial 
systems;  
 the increasing political and economic power of a particular class grouping: the rentier 
class for some (Hilferding 1985); 
   
 22 
 the explosion of financial trading with a myriad of new financial instruments;  
 the “pattern of accumulation in which profit making occurs increasingly through 
financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production’ (Krippner 
2005); 
 the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial 
institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies (Epstein 
2005:3). 
There were many critics of financialisation, and the long progression of financial crises around 
the world served as a reminder that the system was neither self-regulating or robust (Laeven and 
Valencia 2008). However few imagined that the international financial system might prove so 
willfully self-destructive as this 2008 crisis revealed. “You’ve seen the triumph of greed over 
integrity; the triumph of speculation over value creation; the triumph of the short term over long 
term sustainable growth” was the verdict of Australia’s Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd (The 
Australian 6 October 2008). More forcefully still, the Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams 
argued, “Trading the debts of others without accountability has been the motor of astronomical 
financial gain for many in recent years…The crisis exposes the element of basic unreality in the 
situation – the truth that almost unimaginable wealth has been generated by equally unimaginable 
levels of fiction, paper transactions with no concrete outcome beyond profit for traders.. The 
biggest challenge in the present crisis is whether we can recover some sense of the connection 
between money and material reality – the production of specific things, the achievement of 
recognisable human goals that have something to do with a shared sense of what is good for the 
human community in the widest sense.” (The Spectator 27 September 2008). 
THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CAUSES OF THE CRISIS 
The explanation of why investment banks and other financial institutions took such spectacular 
risks with extremely leveraged positions on many securities and derivatives, and the risk 
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management, governance and ethical environment that allowed such conduct to take place is 
worth further analysis. Nobody imagined the scale of the tragedy that befell Wall Streets leading 
investment banks. “Wall Street: RIP,” pronounced The New York Times (28/9/2008). “A world of 
big egos. A world where people love to roll the dice with borrowed money, of tightwire trading, 
propelled by computers... that world is largely coming to an end.” Replacing the triumphal past 
was disillusion and disorientation: “Enthusiasm was gone from Wall Street yesterday, replaced 
by a febrile uncertainty and a foreboding that 2008 might turn into 1929” (Times Online 1 
October 2008). No one had imagined this all could happen this quickly, or could anticipate when 
it might end. On the 18 November 2008 Henry Poulson told Congress he is handing over to 
President-elect Barak Obama “A signficantly more stable banking system, where the failure of a 
systemically relevant institution is no longer a pressing concern rattling the markets.” The 
following day the second largest bank in the United States Citigroup’s shares went into free-fall 
losing 20% of their value each day until the Treasury and Federal Reserve agreed a rescue 
package of over $300 billion. 
De-regulation 
Financial institutions are critical to the operation of any economy, and traditionally subject to a 
framework of firm regulation, however as the financialisation of the US and international 
economy proceeded, paradoxically the regulatory touch lightened considerably. In the words of 
one US finance expert, in the years before the crisis “We were developing a system of very large, 
highly levered, undercapitalised financial institutions – including the investment banks, some 
large money centre banks, the insurance companies with large derivative books and the 
government-sponsored entities…Regulators believe that all of these are too big to fail and would 
bail them out if necessary. The owners, employees and creditors of these institutions are 
rewarded when they succeed, but it is all of us – the taxpayers – who are left on the hook if they 
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fail. This is called private profits and socialised risk. Heads I win. Tails, you lose. It is a reverse 
Robin Hood system” (Einhorn 2008:16-17).  
 
The abolition of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 paved the way for a regulatory loosening of the 
US financial system, enhanced in 2004 by a new SEC rule intended to reduce regulatory costs for 
broker-dealers that were part of consolidated supervised entities. Essentially this involved large 
broker-dealers using their own risk-management practices for regulatory purposes enabling a 
lowering of their capital requirements (the core capital which a bank is required to hold to 
support its risk-taking activities which normally includes share capital, share premium, and 
retained earnings). In addition the SEC amended the definition of net capital to include securities 
for which there was no ready market, and to include hybrid capital instruments and certain 
deferred tax assets, reducing the amount of capital required to engage in high risk activities. 
Finally the rule eased the calculations of counter-party risk, maximum potential exposures, 
margin lending, and allowed broker-dealers to assign their own credit ratings to unrated 
companies. Einhorn comments on this regulatory capitulation of the SEC “Large broker-dealers 
convinced the regulators that the dealers could better measure their own risks, and with fancy 
math, they attempted to show that they could support more risk with less capital. I suspect that 
the SEC took the point of view that these were all large, well-capitalised institutions, with smart, 
sophisticated risk managers who had no incentive to try to fail. Consequently, they gave the 
industry the benefit of the doubt” (2008:16). 
Ratings Agencies 
As international financial markets have expanded the role of the credit ratings agencies (CRAs) 
have proved critical. The International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) claims 
that “CRAs assess the credit risk of corporate or government borrowers and issuers of fixed-
income securities. CRAs attempt to make sense of the vast amount of information available 
   
 25 
regarding an issuer or borrower, its market and its economic circumstances in order to give 
investors and lenders a better understanding of the risks they face when lending to a particular 
borrower or when purchasing an issuer’s fixed-income securities. A credit rating, typically, is a 
CRA’s opinion of how likely an issuer is to repay, in a timely fashion, a particular debt or 
financial obligation, or its debts generally” (2003:1). Yet the question asked by everybody when 
the financial crisis erupted was how could asset backed securities containing subprime mortgages 
and other high risk debt possibly be given AA credit ratings by Standard and Poor’s or Moody’s? 
The answer was again that financial innovation had outpaced regulatory prowess. The ratings 
agencies instead of monitoring rigorously the growth of financial markets and instruments had 
become junior partners in this enterprise. Coffee (2006) in his critique of the failure of the 
gatekeeper professions in US corporate governance including auditors, corporate lawyers, and 
securities analysts, raises the following issues regarding rating agencies: 
i) Concentration 
Given the immense capacity of the ratings agencies to influence the fortunes of financial 
institutions and instruments in terms of the public perception of risk, they have maintained a 
highly profitable duopoly with Standard and Poor’s Ratings Services and Moody’s Investor 
Services, only recently  joined by Fitch Investor services for specialised submarkets. The 
SEC has supported this entrenched market position, reinforced by a reputational capital only 
now being challenged. 
ii) Conflicts of Interest 
Traditionally the ratings agencies rated thousands of clients in the corporate debt business 
with little chance of being captured by single clients. However as the importance of the 
structured debt market grew, there were only a few investment banks active but the scale of 
the market grew exponentially. From the 1970s the ratings agencies business changed from 
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their revenue coming from subscribers for their ratings services, to their revenue coming from 
the issuers of debt products, creating a context for capture by client’s interests. 
iii) Complex Financial Products 
Rating corporate debt utilising corporate financial history, audited financial statements, is less 
difficult than complex structured finance products issued by investment banks. Understanding 
the nature of the underlying assets and cash flows generated by these assets and the risks 
involved over time is a major undertaking. The ratings agencies deny any obligation to do due 
diligence on the portfolio backing structured finance products. 
iv) Timing and Relevance 
Even if the ratings agencies were close in their original rating, they do not review how a debt 
product may change over time in different market conditions, and rating agencies were slow 
to downgrade subprime asset backed securities (Scott 2008 23-24; Coffee 2006). 
The ratings agencies believed in the investment banks of Wall Street, and in their risk controls, 
and assumed that ‘everything was hedged.’ Though the CRAs do have the power to review non-
public information to assess the credit-worthiness of institutions and securities, they did not have 
the inclination, manpower or skills to do this thoroughly in all cases, and they did not get paid 
until they gave a rating. “The market perceives the rating agencies to be doing much more than 
they actually do. The agencies themselves don’t directly misinform the market, but they don’t 
disabuse the market of misperceptions — often spread by the rated entities — that the agencies 
do more than they actually do. This creates a false sense of security, and in times of  stress, this 
actually makes the problems worse. Had the credit rating agencies been doing a reasonable job of 
disciplining the investment banks — which unfortunately happen to bring the rating agencies lots 
of other business — then the banks may have been prevented from taking excess risk and the 
current crisis might have been averted” (Einhorn 2008:13). 
Risk Management  
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Financial businesses activities in rapidly changing markets are highly sensitive to variance, and it 
might be expected that as the financial services industries have grown inexorably and financial 
products become more complex, that the sophistication of risk management techniques will have 
developed in parallel. However the reality is that innovation in financial products has far 
exceeded the capacity of risk management measurement and monitoring tools to gauge risk. The 
most widely employed risk management tool is value-at risk (VaR), which measures how much a 
portfolio stands to make or lose in 99% of the days. But as Einhorn argues this measure ignores 
what might happen at the moment of greatest risk: “A risk manager’s job is to worry about 
whether the bank is putting itself at risk in the unusual times — or, in statistical terms, in the tails 
of distribution. Yet, VaR ignores what happens in the tails. It specifically cuts them off. A 99% 
VaR calculation does not evaluate what happens in the last 1%. This, in my view, makes VaR 
relatively useless as a risk management tool and potentially catastrophic when its use creates a 
false sense of security among senior managers and watchdogs. This is like an airbag that works 
all the time, except when you have a car accident. By ignoring the tails, VaR creates an incentive 
to take excessive but remote risks”(Einhorn 2008:11). Yet VaR was the tool international finance 
industries relied upon in transactions involving billions of dollars. For example UBS was the 
European bank with the largest losses from the crisis, involving the Swiss government and 
central bank providing an aid package of $59.2 billion to take risky debt securities from its 
balance sheet. In a report to shareholders published in April 2008 UBS laid bare the risk 
management failings that had led to such immense losses. (Though wealthy clients continued to 
desert the bank in droves, withdrawing $58 billion in the third quarter of 2008). The report 
highlights in worrying detail the incomplete risk control methodologies, with market risk control 
(MRC) placing considerable reliance on VaR and stress limits to control the risks of the business, 
without implementing additional risk methodologies, or aggregating notional limits even when 
losses were made (2008:13):  
   
 28 
 
i) Mortgage portfolio trades were certified by the UBS investment bank’s quantitative risk 
control “But with the benefit of hindsight appears not have been subject to sufficiently robust 
stress testing. Further, the collateralised debt obligation desk did not carry out sufficient 
fundamental analysis as market conditions deteriorated...” (2008:30).  
ii) With regard to asset backed securities trading also there were incomplete risk control 
methodologies. “There was considerable reliance on AA/AAA ratings and sector concentration 
limits which did not take into account the fact that more than 95% of the asset backed securities 
trading portfolio was referencing US underlying assets (i.e. mortgage loans, auto loans, credit 
card debt etc)” (2008:32).  
iii) In fixed income there was a growth orientation: “The investment bank was focused on the 
maximisation of revenue. There appears to have been a lack of challenge on the risk and reward 
to business area plans within the investment bank at a senior level. UBS’s review suggests an 
asymmetric focus in the investment bank senior management meetings on revenue and profit and 
loss, especially when compared to discussion of risk issues. Business-peer challenge was not a 
routine practice in those meetings...Inappropriate risk metrics were used in strategic planning and 
assessment. Investment Bank planning relied on VaR, which appears as the key risk parameter in 
the planning process. When the market dislocation unfolded, it became apparent that this risk 
measure methodology had not appropriately captured the risk inherent in the business having 
subprime exposures”(2008:34).  
iv) With regard to UBS group governance there was: “Failure to demand a holistic assessment. 
Whilst group senior management was alert to the general issues concerning the deteriorating US 
housing market, they did not demand a holistic presentation of UBS’s exposure to securities 
referencing US real estate assets before July 2007, even though such an assessment may have 
been warranted earlier in view of the size of UBS’s real estate assets” (2008:35). 
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v) The report concluded with reference to risk control that there was over-reliance on VaR and 
stress: “MRC relied on VaR and stress numbers, even though delinquency rates were increasing 
and origination standards were falling in the US mortgage market. It continued to do so 
throughout the build-up of significant positions in subprime assets that were only partially 
hedged. Presentations of MRC to UBS’s senior governance bodies did not provide adequate 
granularity of subprime positions UBS held in its various businesses. No warnings were given to 
group senior management about the limitations of the presented numbers or the need to look at 
the broader contextual framework and the findings were not challenged with perseverance” 
(2008:39). 
vi) Finally the report condemned the lack of independence and healthy scepticism in UBS 
governance: “Fundamental analysis of the subprime market seems to have been generally based 
on the business view and less on MRC’s independent assessment. In particular there is no 
indication that MRC was seeking views from other sources than business…Further, risk systems 
and infrastructure were not improved because of a willingness by the risk function to support 
growth” (2008:39-40). 
Incentivisation  
The final and most critical part of the explanation of why investment banks and other financial 
institutions took such extreme risks with highly leveraged positions in complex securities, 
neglecting risk management, governance principles, and often basic business ethics, was that they 
were highly incentivised to do so. Massively incentivised irresponsibility became the operating 
compensation norm in the financial community, as banks and fringe financial institutions chased 
the super profits available as global financial markets expanded exponentially. “The management 
teams at the investment banks did exactly what they were incentivized to do: maximize employee 
compensation. Investment banks pay out 50% of revenues as compensation. So, more leverage 
means more revenues, which means more compensation. In good times, once they pay out the 
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compensation, overhead and taxes, only a fraction of the incremental revenues fall to the bottom 
line for shareholders. The banks have done a wonderful job at public relations. Everyone knows 
about the 20% incentive fees in the hedge fund and private equity industry. Nobody talks about 
the investment banks’ 50% compensation structures, which have no high-water mark and actually 
are exceeded in difficult times in order to retain talent”(Einhorn 2008:11). The report on the vast 
write-downs at UBS examines how the compensation structure directly generated the behaviour 
which caused the losses, as staff were motivated to utilise the low cost of funding to invest in 
subprime positions. “Employee incentivisation arrangements did not differentiate between return 
generated by skill in creating additional returns versus returns made from exploiting UBS’s 
comparatively low cost of funding in what were essentially carry trades…The relatively high 
yield attributable to subprime made this asset class an attractive long position for carry trades. 
Further, the UBS funding framework amplified the incentives to pursue compensation through 
profitable carry trades. The compensation structure generally made little recognition of risk issues 
or adjustment for risk/other qualitative indicators (e.g. for group internal audit ratings, operational 
risk indicators, compliance issues etc.)” As a result there were insufficient incentives to protect 
the UBS franchise for the longer term “it remains the case that bonus payments for successful and 
senior international business fixed income traders, including those in the businesses holding 
subprime positions were significant. Essentially, bonuses were measured against gross revenue 
after personnel costs, with no formal account taken of the quality and sustainability of those 
earnings” (2008:42). 
 
REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
While the accumulated cost of the global financial crisis was being realised the commitment to 
establish a new international financial regulatory framework increased. As the costs of all forms 
of intervention to alleviate the crisis by the US government ballooned out to $7.7 trillion dollars 
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(including credit discounts, credit extensions, securities lending, term auction facilities, portfolio 
funding, money market funding, TARP, assistance to specific institutions, economic stimulus 
packages, and homeowner assistance),  The general market assistance and specific rescue 
packages for individual financial institutions amounted to almost $11 trillion worldwide by 
October 2008 (Table 2). While these funds could be regarded as a temporary investment in the 
financial economy, with the hope of recouping much of the funds back at a later stage, this was 
an optimistic view when the crisis spread to other sectors of the economy. As the financial crisis 
impacted upon the real economy the fears of a prolonged recession grew, with US industrial 
production falling further than it had for over 30 years, and for example the US automotive 
industry becoming increasingly precarious announcing further major redundancies and looking 
for support from the federal government (including support from the assistance intended for 
financial institutions, since the automotive companies had also become finance companies). The 
International Labour Organisation in Geneva estimated that up to 20 million people in the world 
would lose their employment as a consequence of the financial crisis, and that for the first time in  
a decade the global total of unemployed would be above 200 million (Associated Press, 21 
October 2008). The prospect of the whole world falling into recession at the same time became 
possible, something not witnessed since the 1930s. 
Table 2 Government Support for Global Financial Crisis 2008 
There was a widespread sense that this regulatory failure of financial markets could not be 
allowed to occur again. Chancellor of Germany, usually a stalwart ally of President Bush, derided 
the lack of regulation that, in her view, allowed the financial crisis to erupt in the United States 
and seep inexorably toward Europe. She reminded the German public that the United States and 
Britain rejected her proposals in 2007 for regulating international hedge funds and bond rating 
agencies. "It was said for a long time, 'Let the markets take care of themselves,' " Merkel 
commented. Now, she added, "even America and Britain are saying, 'Yes, we need more 
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transparency, we need better standards.' " Germany's finance minister, Peer Steinbrueck, said that 
the "Anglo-Saxon" capitalist system had run its course and that "new rules of the road" are 
needed, including greater global regulation of capital markets (Washington Post 28 September 
2008). Gordon Brown and Nicolas Sarkozy called for a Bretton Woods agreement for the 21st 
century, aimed at rebuilding the international financial system. Though the economic summit 
meeting of leaders of the G20 countries was arranged for Washington in November 2008, it was 
clear George Bush would not be taking the lead in this initiative. Yet something of a sea-change 
was occurring in American domestic politics in response to the financial crisis and with the 
sweeping election to the US presidency of Barak Obama. The experience of Congress and the 
White House equivocating about a rescue package of buying securities had made a deeply 
unfavourable impression on the US public. The UK government had recognized the deeper 
problem of a lack of confidence in the banks themselves, which was resolved by governments 
becoming the investor of last resort and the guarantor of loans between banks, and it was the 
adoption of a similar strategy by the US government that finally staunched the panic on Wall 
Street. As Andrew Moravcsik, professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton 
University suggested “Americans, especially conservatives, have a particular view of Europe as 
over-regulated, therefore suffering from weak growth and Euro-sclerosis. This could change that 
view and create more respect the European view of regulation more generally” (Australian 
Financial Review 20 October 2008). 
A problem in devising a new financial regulatory architecture was that Bretton Woods in 1944, 
though it established the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, was essentially dealing 
with national financial markets. Digital and interconnected global financial markets presented a 
much bigger challenge. A series of measures were proposed by Gordon Brown:  
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i) Improving risk disclosure by financial institutions was fundamental, together with 
stricter rules on bank liquidity and leveraging.  
ii) Ensuring banks take bigger stakes in any loans they pass on to others through 
securitization might constrain irresponsible innovations. 
iii) Establishing a central clearing house for complex derivatives could help to discipline 
their use.  
iv) Increased supervision and regulation might include new standards for off-balance 
sheet accounting, and supervision of the largest international banks and insurance 
companies.  
v) Reforming executive compensation structures that encouraged excessive risk-taking, 
and aligning reward with long term value creation was another imperative.  
vi) Finally a capacity to police the potential for future dangers to the international 
economy, and the means of cooperation for future crises were important (The Times 
16 October 2008). 
These principles for reforming international financial market were broadly supported in Europe, 
and had public resonance in the United States where it was argued the rapid expansion of 
unregulated financial institutions and instruments from hedge funds to credit default swaps 
should be contained by extending financial reserve requirements, limiting leveraging, and 
ensuring trading occurred on public exchanges (Wall Street Journal 25 July 2008; IPS 2008). 
With the international financial community still in a state of profound shock, and heavily 
dependent upon state aid, any protests about the dangers of over-regulation were muted. Adair 
Turner head of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK (responsible for regulating 
financial institutions) commented, "If a year and a half ago, the FSA had wanted higher capital 
adequacy, more information on liquidity, had said it was worried about the business models at 
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Bradford & Bingley and Northern Rock, and had wanted to ask questions about remuneration, the 
fact is that we would have been strongly criticised for harming the competitiveness of the City of 
London, red tape, and over regulation. We are now in a different environment. We shouldn't 
regulate for it’s own sake, but over-regulation and red tape has been used as a polemical 
bludgeon. We have probably been over-deferential to that rhetoric" (Guardian, 16 October 2008).  
However the question is, will the deference of regulators return when financial markets recover, 
and financial institutions and markets are free again to pursue their self-interest? An early 
indication of how entrenched the irresponsibility of the financial sector had become was the 
astonishing news that the surviving US financial institutions were preparing to pay 2008 end of 
year executive bonuses approximately equivalent to the billions of dollars of aid they had just 
received from Congress. While the US economy was collapsing around them, and the US public 
were becoming increasingly concerned how they might survive a severe recession, the executives 
of major banks seemed focused primarily on maintaining their bonuses.  
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Table 1   Subprime Losses by International Banks October 2008 
 
 Company Country (bn $US ) 
1 Citigroup US 66.6 
2 Wachovia US 52.7 
3 Merrill Lynch US 54.6 
4 Washington Mutual US 45.6 
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5 UBS Switzerland 44.2 
6 HSBC UK 27.4 
7 Bank of America US 21.2 
8 JP Morgan Chase US 18.8 
9 Morgan Stanley US 15.7 
10 IKB Deutsche Germany 14.7 
11 Royal Bank of Scotland UK 16.5 
12 Lehman Brothers US 18.2 
13 AIG US 16.8 
14 Fannie Mae US 12.7 
15 Deutsche Bank Germany 11.4 
16 Ambac US 10.3 
17 Wells Fargo US 10 
18 MBIA Inc US 9.4 
19 Barclays UK 9.2 
20 Credit Agricole France 8.6 
21 Credit Suisse Switzerland 8.1 
22 HBOS UK 7.5 
23 Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Canada 7.1 
24 Fortis Belgium/ 
Netherlands 
6.9 
25 Bayerische Landesbank Germany 6.7 
26 Freddie Mac US 6.7 
27 ING Netherlands 6.5 
28 Societe Generale France 6.4 
29 Mizuho Financial Group Japan 6.2 
30 Dresdner Bank Germany 5 
31 Bear Sterns US 3.4 
32 WestLB Germany 3.1 
33 BNP Paribas France 2.7 
34 UniCredit Italy 2.7 
35 Lloyds TSB UK 2.6 
36 Nomura Holdings Japam 2.5 
37 DZ Bank Germany 2 
38 Natixis France 2 
39 Swiss Re Switzerland 1.8 
40 HSH Nordbank Germany 1.7 
41 LBBW Germany 1.7 
42 Commerzbank Germany 1.2 
43 Mitsubishi UFJ Japan 1.2 
44 Sumitomo Japan 1.2 
45 AXA France 1.1 
 Total Losses  582.60 
 
Sources: Individual Banks; Central Banks. 
 
 
Table 2 Government Support for Global Financial Crisis 2008 
 USD 
Europe $ 1.8   trillion 
UK $  856 billion 
US $ 7.74 trillion 
Sweden $ 205 billion 
South Korea $ 130 billion 
Australia $ 10.4 billion 
Rest of the world $ 105.12 billion 
Total 10.93  trillion 
Source: Compiled from  
BBC Credit Crisis: World in Turmoil http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7654647.stm,  
ABC News, Tuesday 21 of October, 2008. http://www.abc.net.au/ 
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Reuters,http://www.reuters.com/article/forexNews/idUSTRE49J2GB20081020 
IMF Global Financial Stability Report October 2008 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2008/02/index.htm 
 
 
Appendix  1    Transatlantic Contagion: US and European Bank Failures 
 
September 2007 
1 Northern 
Rock 
UK Northern Rock faced a run on the bank, rescued by the British government loan of £26 
billion and guarantees of ₤30 billion and effectively nationalized in February 2008 
ultimately extending ₤119 billion in support 
 
 
March 2008 
2 Bear Sterns US Federal Reserve of New York offered emergency loan, but could not be saved. Bought by 
JPMorgan Chase in a deal sponsored by the US Federal Reserve, sold at $10 per share, far 
below 52 week highest price of $133 per share. 
 
July 2008 
3                 IndiMac                US           A commercial bank with $19 billion in deposits, on the brink of failure was  
                                                                 Taken over by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) 
 
September 2008 
                Fannie Mae 
& Freddie 
Mac 
US With combined losses of $14.9 billion and their ability to raise capital and debt 
threatened, the two agencies had outstanding more than $5 trillion in mortgage-backed 
securities (the national debt of the US is by comparison $9.5 trillion. The US government 
took the two mortgage agencies into ‘conservatorship’ with the Treasury contributing 
$US 200 billion in preferred stock and credit through 2009 
 
4 AIG  US 
 
AIG was one of the world’s largest insurance companies specializing in high margin 
corporate coverage. It’s  share price fell 95% to $1.25 from a 52 week high of $70, with 
the company reporting a $13.2 billion loss for the first six months of the year. The Federal 
Reserve offered a credit facility of up to $85 billion in exchange for warrants for a 79.9% 
equity stake, the largest government bailout of a private company in US history. Later this 
rescue package was increase to $150 billion, with the US Treasury purchasing $40 billion 
in preferred shares. 
 
5 Lehman 
Brothers 
 
US With large positions in subprime mortgages was declared bankrupt after US Federal 
Reserve refused bailout. Barclay’s bought its investment banking arm for $1.75 billion 
. 
6 Merrill Lynch US Bloomberg reported that Merrill Lynch had lost $51.8 billion in mortgage-backed 
securities. The firm was bought by Bank of America for $US 50 billion.  
 
7 HBOS UK The UK’s largest mortgage lender, Bought by British rival Lloyds TSB for £ 12 billion. 
 
8 Washington 
Mutual 
 
US After a 10 day $16.4 billion bank run was declared bankrupt and placed in the 
receivership of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; JPMorgan Chase bought the 
banking assets from US government. Before the sixth largest bank in the US (with assets 
of $327 billion), this was the largest bank failure in US history. 
 
9 Bradford & 
Bingley 
UK Nationalized by British government; Savings operations sold to Spain’s Group Santander 
 
10 Fortis Benelux A banking, insurance and investment company, the 20th largest business in the world by 
revenue. Dutch operations nationalized by Netherlands; Belgian and Luxemburg 
operations bought by France’s BNP Paribas 
 
11 Dexia Belgium A financial services company bailed out by French, Belgian and Luxemburg governments 
with € 6.4 billion 
 
 
October 2008 
12 Wachovia US With assets of $783 billion, the fourth largest bank holding company in the US. Reported 
an anticipated $8.9 billion loss for the second quarter of 2008. Subject of a $US 15 billion 
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takeover offer from Wells Fargo, which is being contested by Citigroup 
 
13 Glitnir Iceland One of the three major commercial banks of Iceland, Icelandic government injects € 600 
million for 75% stake, as part of a rescue of the country’s entire financial system. Shortly 
afterwards Kaupthing Edge part of Iceland’s leading bank failed, and Landsbanki the 
third bank failed, as Iceland’s entire banking system collapsed and were taken over by the 
government. Since Icelandic banks held foreign assets worth 10 times the GDP of the 
country, there are concerns the government is bankrupt as it urgently sought loans from 
the IMF and Russia. 
 
14 Hypo Real 
Estate 
Germany The second largest commercial property lender in Germany, which includes Depfa 
property finance bank. German government leads a  € 50 billion bailout 
with the German banks contributing  €30 billion and the Bundesbank €20 billion 
 
15 Preference 
shares in: 
Bank of 
America, 
Citigroup, 
JPMorgan, 
Wells Fargo, 
Goldman 
Sachs, 
Morgan 
Stanley, PNC, 
and  18 other 
banks 
 
US Following a series of individual rescue attempts, the US government resolves to offer 
general support to the failing financial system. The US Federal Treasurer Hank Poulson’s 
package of US$720 billion to relieve financial institutions of subprime and other toxic 
assets. After a troubled passage through Congress reflecting the public’s anger at ‘bailing 
out Wall Street’ conditions are attached regarding public oversight and executive pay. 
Subsequently followed the UK policy in purchasing preference shares of banks to rebuild 
the capital adequacy of large banks in the United States. 
 
16 Preference 
shares in: 
Barclays, 
HBOS, 
Lloyds TSB, 
Nationwide, 
Royal Bank 
of Scotland, 
Abbey, 
Standard 
Chartered 
 
UK In response to collapsing bank share prices, and a rapidly weakening financial sector, the 
UK government determines on a major three part intervention: a ₤50 billion offer to buy 
preference shares to assist the major banks to rebuild their capital reserves; ₤200 billion 
of liquidity in short term loans to thaw the inter-bank lending markets; and a further  ₤250 
billion to underwrite lending between banks. Conditions include restraint on dividend 
policies, executive pay, and support for lending to small businesses and home buyers. 
17 UBS Switzerland Swiss bank UBS AG told it expected to post net losses of 12 billion Swiss francs 
(US$12.1 billion) for the first quarter of 2008 and would seek 15 billion Swiss francs 
(US$15.1 billion) in new capital. UBS announced losses and writedowns of 
approximately US$19 billion on U.S. real estate and related credit positions, Swiss 
government took an indirect SF 6 billion stake in UBS. Swiss national bank took $59 
billion of UBS’s illiquid US securities 
 
18 ING Netherlands ING one of the world’s largest banks with 85 million customers worldwide, and with 385 
billion euros in saving and current account deposits announces it expects to make a  €500 
third quarter loss. The Dutch government makes a  €10 billion cash injection for shares in 
the bank. 
 
19 D.Carnegie & 
Co AB 
Sweden Sweden’s largest publicly traded investment bank founded 200 years ago having lost 87% 
ot its value, was seized by the Swedish government, accused of taking exceptional risks, 
to be sold off in parts. 
 
20 
 
Citigroup US Citigroup is unable to stem losses and markets become concerned. Citigroups shares fall 
23% on 19 November to their lowest since May 1995 CEO announces winding down off-
balance sheet businesses and making 52,000 redundancies. The following day the shares 
fall a further 20%, and the day after another 20%. Realising only government rescue will 
save one of the world’s largest banks, the Federal Reserve and Treasury agree Citigroup a  
“systemic risk” to allow $300 billion rescue 
 
 
 
